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Introduction
Despite recent calls for legislative change in the area, the law in relation to consent to medical
treatment for those under the age of 18 in Ireland remains unfortunately, and perhaps
dangerously, murky. This article proposes to analyse the law in relation to three categories of
“children”, looking first at proxy consent for young children, secondly at consent for those aged 16
and 17, and finally at the possibility of a Gillick-type consent process in this jurisdiction, that is,
consent for sufficiently mature under-16s. We will ultimately argue that, rather than addressing
this issue on a piecemeal basis through various pieces of legislation, the time has come for a
single Act which definitively provides for statutory clarity in this area.
General Principles
For the purposes of clarity, it is important to note at the outset that it is generally accepted that
the constitutional rights which are afforded to parents in respect of their children under Arts 41
and 42 of the Constitution apply until children reach the age of majority—that is, 18 years of age.1
However, as the Law Reform Commission observes, “at various points, in particular through the
teenage years, children and young people develop increasingly sophisticated cognitive capacity
and related decision-making judgement”. 2 Simply put, the rules and policies in relation to medical
decision-making for two-year-old infants cannot apply to 17-year-olds on the cusp of adulthood.
Similarly, in considering medical decision-making, we cannot but refer to statutory principles
which are tangentially, but no less importantly, linked to medical law. So, for example, when
looking at proxy decision-making, we must consider principles of family law, and in particular the
rights and responsibilities of parents who, for whatever reason, may not necessarily agree on
what course of treatment is appropriate. Similarly, in the context of older minors, we cannot but
consider medical decision-making in relation to, for example, contraception, without keeping in
mind the fact that the age of consent to sexual intercourse is 17 under the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences) Act 2006.3 Equally too we have to be mindful of the provisions of the Mental Health Act
2001 in so far as they concern the involuntary admission of children. 4 Legal principles aside, we
must also understand that “medical treatment” refers to everything from administering low doses
of pain relief to seriously invasive treatments, as well as the refusal of such treatments. In short,
in this area of law, perhaps more than most, we cannot assume that one principle can apply
across all age groups, or across all types of medical practice. In this context, art.12 of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child states:
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States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own view the
right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child
being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
Kaplan argues forcefully that this article establishes that, in the context of medical treatment,
“children must be imparted with rights in accordance with their varying stages of development,
and hence, the legal weight attached to their opinions will be related to an objective factor, their
age, and a subjective factor, their intellectual maturity”.5
These concerns accepted, there are a number of general guidelines and principles which guide
medical practitioners when they are treating anyone under the age of 18. The HSE's National
Consent Policy6 states at the outset that in any matter relating to children, the child's best
interests are of paramount importance, and advocates for an approach which “involves putting
the interests and wellbeing of the child at the centre of all decisions and ensuring that the child's
own voice is heard and respected as far as possible”. 7 Developing on this, the Policy recognises
that there is a crucial difference between involving a child in the decision-making process on the
one hand, and the child consenting to medical treatment on the other:
“[E]ven where children are unable to give a valid consent for themselves, they should
nonetheless be as involved as possible in decision-making as even young children may have
opinions about their healthcare and have the right to have their views taken into
consideration by giving their assent to the proposed treatment or service.”8
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This position is reflected in the Medical Council's Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics for
Registered Medical Practitioners, which states:
“Children and young people should be involved as much as possible in discussions about
their healthcare. When you are talking to a child or young person, it is important to give them
information in an age-appropriate manner, listen to their views and treat them with respect.”9
Generally speaking, then, while it is acknowledged that children and young people may not have
the legal capacity to consent to treatment in all circumstances, they should nonetheless be
involved in the decision-making process in so far as is possible.10 In this regard, Kilkelly and
Donnelly's work on the child's right to be heard in the healthcare setting is of fundamental
importance. 11 Here we will assess decision-making capacity in three contexts: the young child
and proxy consent; young adults (16 and 17-year-olds); and the “mature minor” under 16.
The Young Child and Proxy Consent
As the Law Reform Commission notes in its recent Report, Children and the Law: Medical
Treatment,12 in respect of very young children, as parents and guardians are generally
accountable for their safety and welfare, they make all major decisions on behalf of those
children. 13 In the context of medical decision-making, these decisions will, in general, be upheld,
“even if this is in conflict with the views of professional persons”. 14
No such position is, however, absolute, and this proxy power is not unlimited. As was argued in
Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB,15 “the power [of parents to
consent to the medical treatment of a child] does not extend to, for example, the right to have a
child's foot cut off so that he or she could earn money begging”. 16 Closer to home, this position is
evidenced in the seminal case of North Western Health Board v W. 17 Here, the parents of a
young child refused consent for the performance of a PKU test. 18 While the performance of the
test, according to the Supreme Court, was “unquestionably in the best interests of the infant”, 19
the court upheld the parents' refusal, stating that the Constitution protected the institution of the
family to the extent that parents were constitutionally permitted to make what might be
considered unwise medical decisions in relation to their child. According to Murphy J., before the
State could intervene, a situation would have to arise
“where either the general conduct or circumstances of the parent is such as to constitute a
virtual abdication of their responsibility or alternatively, the disastrous consequences of a
particular parental decision are so immediate and inevitable as to demand intervention and
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perhaps call into question either the basic competence or devotion of the parents”.20
Thus, it would seem according to this decision that parental autonomy in this regard is almost
sacrosanct, with Hardiman J. indicating that parents' proxy decision-making capabilities could
only be overturned where there were “countervailing constitutional considerations, or perhaps in
the case of an immediate threat to the life of the child”. The case has, however, been criticised for
“attaching no weight to the autonomous right of the child to have his health, life and welfare
protected”.21 Indeed, Keane C.J. (dissenting) took the view that the parents had refused to protect
the child's constitutional right “to be guarded against unnecessary and avoidable dangers” to his
health, and that the court should intervene in the child's best interests. 22
An example of a case in which parental refusal to treat was overturned is Re Baby B: Temple
Street v D.23 This case concerned a baby who was very unwell and required a blood transfusion.
The parents, as Jehovah's Witnesses, refused to consent to this transfusion and the hospital
sought an order to override the refusal of consent. Referring to Arts 41 and 42 of the Constitution,
and in particular Art.42.5, Hogan J., while clearly acknowledging that the parents had not “failed”
in their duty to their child in any real sense of the term, stated that, from a constitutional
perspective, the test of whether parents have “failed” is “an objective one judged by the secular
standards of society in general and of the Constitution in particular, irrespective of their own
subjective religious views”. 24 Based on the jurisdiction of the court under Art.40.3.2°, the court
granted a declaration that it was lawful to administer the blood transfusion in the case.
An interesting case in this regard is HSE v F.25 Here, a woman living with the HIV virus refused to
take antiretroviral medications during the course of her pregnancy, and stated that she did not
intend to consent to the administration of such medications on behalf of the child following its
birth. Importantly, the administration of such medications was not sought in an effort to protect
the life of the child, but rather to protect his or her health. Broughton reports that Birmingham J.
ruled that the child was to receive “such medical treatment as may in [his/her] treating doctors'
opinion be necessary”, including, “but not limited to”, medical treatments which would reduce the
risk of the transmission of the HIV virus from the woman to her child. 26 Broughton observes:
“Birmingham J. expressed the view that if there was a substantial body of opinion amongst
medical professionals voicing concerns about the drugs, even if it were a minority, he would
have *67 come down in favour of the mother. However, on balance, the judge, who spoke of
the significant and superior position of the family under the Irish Constitution, believed that
the risk of the child not being treated was greater than the risks posed by the drugs, and
ruled accordingly.”27
Broughton quite rightly points out that this case lies between the W case and the Baby B case:
“The risk of the death of the child without the treatment is not as remote as in the PKU case, yet it
is not nearly as imminent and serious as it would be in the case of the need for an immediate
blood transfusion.”28 She refers to an exception mentioned in the W case by Hardiman J. in the
context of the control of infectious and/or communicable diseases, but these exceptions are
statutory ones, and indeed ones which have not yet been legislated for. 29 It would appear that
this case marks a new departure in law: deferring to the views of the medical profession as to
what constitutes the best interests of a child over those of a parent.
When Parents/Guardians Disagree
Where parents agree, the situation seems to be that, unless the refusal of treatment would place
the life or health of the child at immediate and serious risk, such a refusal will be respected by
medical practitioners. However, the established case law deals with the general position which
assumes that parents and guardians will always agree on what constitutes the appropriate
medical care for their child. This, of course, is not always the case. This question has been
obliquely referred to in cases of joint guardianship under s.11 of the Guardianship of Infants Act
1964 (the “1964 Act”) where, for example, it has been held that while day-to-day matters can be
decided unilaterally by the custodial parent, the non-custodial parent has a right to be consulted
in relation to “welfare matters of importance”.30 Where parents disagree, it may be necessary to
apply to the court under s.11(1) of the 1964 Act. 31
At the Heads of Bill stage of the Children and Family Relationships Act 2015 (the “2015 Act”),
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Head 36 sought to clarify this position, and provided that, in general, when exercising any duties,
powers, rights or responsibilities in relation to a child, any guardian should “act jointly (in
particular by consulting wherever practicable with the aim of securing agreement) with any other
guardian of the child”. Head 36(5)(b) continued by stating that each guardian has the
responsibility to “ensure the child is properly maintained and supported and is provided with
necessary medical care…”. In this context, each guardian was given the power to “consent to
medical, dental and other health related treatment for the child”, a power they must exercise,
according to Head 36(7), “in a manner consistent with the age and maturity and evolving capacity
of the child”. An application for a review of any “significant decision” by a guardian could be made
to a court under Head 45(1) by a guardian “or any person”. A “significant decision” means a
decision which:
(a)
(a) could seriously damage or cause a serious risk to the health or safety of a child, or
(b)
(b) is likely to have serious long-term consequences for the child.32
Additionally, any guardian of a child could apply to the court under Head 45(3) “for its direction on
any question affecting the welfare of the child and the court may make such order as it thinks
proper”, a procedure similar to that found in the current s.11 of the 1964 Act.
It seems, then, that the Heads of the new Bill 33 provided for a more consultative and engaged
decision-making process in the context of child welfare, and, particularly, medical
decision-making. There was an obligation on guardians to act jointly in exercising their duties
under Head 36(1), and the non-custodial guardian continued to exercise the same rights as the
custodial guardian.
However, these provisions did not form part of the Bill as initiated. At Committee Stage, Deputy
Alan Shatter pointed out that Head 36 and its subheads had been “based on best practice in
other jurisdictions” and that they “helped to create an ethos in which the courts would encourage
co-operation between estranged parents in the interests of children”.34
The Minister for Justice and Equality, Deputy Frances Fitzgerald, indicated to Deputy Shatter that
the reason Head 36 was not included was because the legal advice the Government received
was that if they drafted the legislation in a “stronger way”, it would “cast into doubt the right of the
guardian to make any decision unilaterally”.35
It remains the case, therefore, and somewhat unsatisfactorily, that a guardian still applies under
s.11 of the 1964 Act for direction in the event of a disagreement with another guardian in relation
to medical treatment. What is interesting in this regard is that, under s.3(1) of the current 1964
Act, in making a decision under s.11(1) of that Act, the court must consider the “welfare” of the
child. Section 45 of the 2015 Act changes this test, bringing the legislative position into line with
the Constitution following its amendment,36 and states, in amending s.3 of the 1964 Act, that:
Where, in any proceedings before any court, the—
(a)
(a) guardianship, custody or upbringing of, or access to, a child …
is in question, the court, in deciding that question, *68 shall regard the best interests of the child
as the paramount consideration.37
However, this decision will not be made solely on what is considered the best medical interests of
the child, or what the court subjectively believes is in the best interests of the child. Schweppe
argues elsewhere that in making decisions such as this, “the court should adopt a test … which
takes parental views and best medical practice into account, but also considers questions such
as the religious background of the child … the extent of the parental opposition, the wishes of the
child, where relevant, and the experience of siblings”.38 This broad approach is reflected in the
2015 Act which, under s.63, inserts a new Part into the 1964 Act—Pt V, entitled “Best Interests of
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the Child”—which requires the court to take a multiplicity of factors into account when
determining what is in the best interests of the child, including in this context:
-
- the benefit for the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents;
-
- the ascertainable views of the child concerned, giving due weight to such views having regard
to the age and maturity of the child;
-
- the physical, psychological and emotional needs of the child;
-
- the history of the child's upbringing and care; and
-
- the child's religious, spiritual, cultural and linguistic upbringing and needs.
The primacy afforded to a broader best interests test in the 2015 Act is to be welcomed.
However, the 2015 Act leaves unanswered the question of whether joint medical decision-making
is required in the case of joint guardianship. The HSE's Quality and Patient Safety Division and
the HSE's National Immunisation Office both recommended that the “default position in relation to
medical consent be one parent/legal guardian consent in line with the HSE National Consent
Policy to safeguard the best interests of children”.39
This Policy 40 discusses the requirement for joint consent in the context of proxy decision-making
concerning a child under the age of 16. The general principle is that parents or guardians can
consent to the treatment of such a child, and that such consent can be provided by telephone. On
the question of whether joint or individual consent is required, the Policy states that this is a
matter of some controversy. The Policy is worth quoting in some length on this issue:
“On the one hand, it may be argued that the consent of both parents/legal guardians is
required prior to the treatment of the child on the basis of the rights of the parents/legal
guardians in keeping with Article 41 of the Constitution … and the Guardianship of Infants
Act 1964. However, seeking joint parental consent may cause delays in children receiving
services and potential logistical difficulties in ensuring that all forms are co-signed … In
addition the requirement for joint consent may be perceived by those parents/legal guardians
not in dispute to be bureaucratic.”41
There are three points to make on this statement. First, if consent can be given by telephone, any
“logistical difficulties” can be overcome without any real difficulty. Secondly, there is absolutely no
way for a medical practitioner to determine if parents or guardians are or are not “in dispute”—if
they are in such a dispute, it is unlikely that the presenting parent will highlight this fact to the
treating physician. Indeed, at a later point in the Policy, it suggests that “[w]here both
parents/legal guardians have indicated a wish and willingness to participate fully in decision
making for their child, this must be accommodated as far as possible by the service provider”.42
However, in the absence of any advance directive or signed (and adequately witnessed)
statement to this effect, it seems next to impossible to see how this could be put into effect.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it seems unusual and indeed unwise to suggest that any
rights of parents, guardians or indeed children themselves under legislation or the Constitution
should be brushed aside for “bureaucratic” reasons.
The reasoning behind this position becomes more clear when we see that the Policy goes on to
essentially view any proposal of treatment by a medical practitioner as being in the best interests
of the child:
“The acceptance of consent of one parent/legal guardian assumes that the child's welfare is
paramount, which is in line with the Child Care Acts 1991 and 2001, and that the Health and
Social Care professional is proposing a treatment or intervention in the child's best interests.
It also assumes that both of the parents/legal guardians are concerned with the child's
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welfare.”43
However, if we view best medical interests as but one factor (albeit an important one) in the
medical decision-making process, again, this view is untenable. The presumption that the best
interests of a child will be that action which is proposed by a medical practitioner fails to take into
account the multiplicity of factors outlined in s.63 of the 2015 Act. As we clearly saw in the case
of North Western Health Board v W, medical best interests may not necessarily equate to the
overall best interests of a child. Further, if we view consent as encompassing a right to consent
to, but also a right to refuse, medical treatment, the issue becomes even less clear. If the
presenting parent/guardian refuses medical treatment, should (or can) a doctor seek consent
from *69 the non-presenting parent in order to ensure that the best interests of the child are
secured? As McMahon and Binchy observe, “[i]t will be interesting to see if the recent Children's
Right amendment to the Constitution has strengthened the rights of children to be protected from
injury or death through the exercise of parental autonomy”.44
All that said, the argument made at the Bill stage of the 2015 Act, essentially seeing any general
principle which would require joint decision-making for all medical decisions as being unworkable,
and potentially causing delays, has merit. If a general practitioner, for example, had to telephone
the non-presenting parent or guardian for consent every time he or she examined a child, this
would indeed be unworkable and cause unacceptable delays. We would argue that, in the same
way that capacity to consent is viewed on a continuum,45 we could look at medical
decision-making processes in a similar manner, which would allow both parental/ guardianship
rights, as well as the rights of the child, to be considered commensurate with the age and
maturity of the child.
Consent to Treatment and the Young Person
On its face, the legal situation in relation to 16 and 17-year-olds is less problematic. Section 23 of
the Non-Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997 (the “1997 Act”) governs the law concerning
the medical treatment of young people 46 and provides:
(1)
(1) The consent of a minor who has attained the age of 16 years to any surgical, medical or
dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute a trespass to his or her
person, shall be as effective as it would be if he or she were of full age; and where a minor has
by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treatment it shall not be necessary to
obtain any consent for it from his or her parent or guardian.
(2)
(2) In this section, ‘surgical, medical or dental treatment’ includes any procedure undertaken for
the purposes of diagnosis, and this section applies to any procedure (including, in particular, the
administration of an anaesthetic) which is ancillary to any treatment as it applies to that
treatment.
(3)
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as making ineffective any consent which would
have been effective if this section had not been enacted.
The question is whether s.23 confers an absolute right to consent on 16 and 17-year-olds in the
absence of parental consent or knowledge. The Medical Council's Guide to Professional Conduct
and Ethics for Registered Medical Practitioners47 simply states that “[p]atients aged 16 years and
over are entitled by law to give their own consent to surgical, medical or dental treatment. This
entitlement does not apply to other areas such as organ or tissue donation or participation in
medical research”. 48
However, the law in this area is not as clear-cut as the Medical Council outlines. The Law Reform
Commission in its Report, Children and the Law: Medical Treatment,49 outlined the issues
succinctly:
“[W]hile the decisions in the McK case and the D case are at least consistent with the view
that 16 and 17 year olds often have the capacity to make significant health care decisions,
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and that the concept of a ‘mature minor’ is also consistent with this approach, there is no
definitive legal framework that clarifies the respective rights and responsibilities of those
under 18, their parents and guardians, still less the health care professionals who come into
contact with them.”50
Discussing s.23 of the 1997 Act, McMahon and Binchy 51 detail the nature of the consent
required:
“The section throws no light on what is necessary to constitute such a consent. The
reference in sub-s (1) to ‘an effective consent’ does not refer to the quality of the consent; it
merely relates back to the earlier part of the sentence where legal effectiveness is conferred
on the consent by reason of the fact of its being provided by the minor. The courts may be
disposed to treat the question of the minor's consent as ‘one of fact’, dependent on the
circumstances of the case, including the particular minor's age and maturity (or lack of it) as
well as the nature of the medical treatment. It can be predicted that the courts will closely
scrutinise elective interventions of a cosmetic nature.”52
They also note, as we have already observed in relation to proxy consent for young children, that
any legislative or policy position in relation to consent to medical treatment cannot be observed
without reference to the Constitution: “Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution recognise the
trusteeship role of parents in the upbringing and protection of their children”, noting that
legislation cannot “subtract” from this constitutional provision, though it can offer clarification on
the issue.53 Another consideration is the recent amendment to the Constitution, Art.42A, in which
the State “recognises and affirms the natural and imprescriptible rights of all children”. As Walsh
J. in the Supreme Court summarised in G v An Bord Uchtála 54:
“The child's natural rights spring primarily from the natural right of every individual to life, to
be reared and educated, to liberty, to work, to rest and recreation, to the practice of religion,
and to follow his or her conscience … The child's natural *70 right to life and all that flows
from that right are independent of any right of the parent as such.”55
Where the constitutional rights of the child and the constitutional rights of the parents/guardians
come into conflict, this serves to further underlie the need for legislative clarity in this area. Again,
the question of a continuum of treatment arises here. McMahon and Binchy postulate that while a
17-year-old could lawfully consent to, for example, an operation on her broken finger in the
absence of parental consent or knowledge, in the case of “serious” medical intervention, where
there may be a case that intervention is “not truly for the minor's welfare”, the legal position
becomes less clear.56
The question as to whether proceedings could be brought in relation to treatment in the absence
of medical consent remains unclear. On one reading, as McMahon and Binchy note, the section
disentitles parents or guardians from taking any steps in relation to the medical treatment of their
child. On another reading, however:
“[W]hat s 23 does is to render the consent lawful to the extent that it cannot be regarded as
unlawful by reasons merely of the failure to obtain the consent of the parents or guardians.
On this latter view, the trusteeship function is not disturbed and parents or guardians remain
entitled (to the uncertain extent that they have such an entitlement) to take proceedings in
respect of the treatment in the same way as they can with respect to any other lawful activity
… in which their minor child engages.”57
Quill argues that the position is even muddier—s.23, he observes, certainly provides that the
consent of a minor aged 16 or over to medical or dental treatment will provide a defence against
a criminal assault charge, but it is not clear whether the 1997 Act also applies to a civil claim;
though he admits that one would expect the courts to take some guidance from this in respect of
such a claim.58 Thus, it could be argued that s.23 is not in fact a facilitative section at all; rather, it
simply provides a defence for a doctor to a criminal action post-treatment.
In terms of other legislation on the issue of validity of consent, s.4(1)(a) of the Health (Family
Planning) (Amendment) Act 1992 further provides that contraceptives may only lawfully be sold
to persons over the age of 17 or someone under the age of 17 who has a prescription for
contraceptives. Thus, it would appear that a minor over the age of 16 can receive contraceptives
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without the need for involvement of his or her parents. Donnelly, however, has argued that it
would be contrary to the authority of the family under the Constitution to provide contraceptive
treatment to a child aged under 17 without the consent of her parents.59 On this line of reasoning,
there should be no distinction between 16 and 17-year-olds, though Mills makes the point that it
is questionable whether the provision of contraceptives amounts to “medical treatment” under the
1997 Act, it “not being a treatment or procedure in the commonly understood sense of the word”.
60 Further, to add to the confusion, the Children First policy issued by the Department of Children
and Youth Affairs 61 provides:
“The cooperation of parents/carers should be sought for any examinations and assessment
considered necessary. If cooperation is not forthcoming, the possibility of legal action should
be considered and conveyed to parents/carers.”62
As a child is defined as “a person under the age of 18 years”, this seems to be potentially
problematic in the context of 16 and 17-year-olds, though it is unclear as to how the key principle
that the age of the child should be taken account of “in all matters and decisions that may affect
their lives”63 interacts with this requirement.
Despite these questions, and the strong constitutional position afforded to the family, in D v
Brennan (the “Miss D” case),64 it would appear that the question never arose as to her capacity to
consent to medical treatment. 65 The Miss D case was a case in which a 17-year-old in the care
of the health board, whose baby had a fatal foetal abnormality, sought permission to travel for the
purpose of a termination. From an examination of the newspaper reports, it appears that the only
reference to her ability to consent was made by counsel for the unborn, who stated that because
Miss D was over 16, she could make her own decisions about medical procedures. 66 However,
there were numerous statements by McKechnie J. where he was clearly impressed by Miss D's
“courage, integrity and maturity”; perhaps he was applying the common law position 67 in
interpreting s.23, i.e. where the minor is mature enough to understand the nature and purpose of
the treatment, she can be deemed competent to consent to that treatment. This would follow on
from the Supreme Court's statement in McK v Information Commissioner, 68 in which an
estranged father sought access to his daughter's medical records, that the views of a minor of
nearly 18 years of age are “very relevant”.
Because the question seemed moot in the Miss D case—that is, that it was always assumed that
Miss D could consent to medical treatment—the question as to the capacity of young people to
consent to medical treatment was not advanced any by this judgment. As has been discussed,
prior to the decision, it was suspected that were a young person to seek medical treatment,
specifically a termination of pregnancy, parental consent (or the consent of the health board)
would have to be obtained. In the Miss D case, it *71 seemed that she had full capacity to make
the decision to terminate her pregnancy without the consent of her mother, and certainly without
the consent of the health board.
Consent to Treatment and the Mature Minor
The question then arises in relation to a young woman under the age of 16, and whether it is
lawful to treat or give abortion information to her in the absence of parental consent or
knowledge.
The Medical Council's Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Medical
Practitioners69 states:
“43.4 Where the patient is under the age of 16 years, it is usual that the parents will be asked
to give their consent to medical treatment on the patient's behalf.
43.5 In exceptional circumstances, a patient under 16 might seek to make a healthcare decision
on their own without the knowledge or consent of their parents. In such cases you should
encourage the patient to involve their parents in the decision, bearing in mind your paramount
responsibility to act in the patient's best interests.”
As we have seen, according to s.23 of the 1997 Act, where a young person over the age of 16 is
in the care of her parents, a doctor cannot be held criminally liable for providing medical
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treatment to her in the absence of parental knowledge or consent. For those under the age of 16,
as the Law Reform Commission notes,
“the ‘usual’ position is that parents should be asked for their consent, but … in ‘exceptional
circumstances’ the doctor would ‘encourage’ the under 16 year old to involve their parents,
bearing in mind the doctor's ‘paramount responsibility’ to act in the patient's best interests”.70
The case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority71 concerned a mother who
sought assurances that her daughters, who were under the age of 16, would not be provided with
contraceptive treatment in the absence of her knowledge or consent. Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
first considered the contention of Mrs Gillick that, as a result of s.8(1) of the Family Law Reform
Act 1969, consent by a minor to medical treatment would be ineffective. He disagreed, being of
the opinion that subs.(3) of the same section leaves open the question of whether consent by a
minor under the age of 16 would have been effective if the section had not been enacted. 72
The court then went on to consider whether giving such advice and treatment to a minor under 16
without her parents' consent infringes the parents' rights. Lord Fraser stated that: “Once the rule
of the parents' absolute authority over minor children is abandoned, the solution to the problem
… cannot be found by reference to rigid parental rights of what is best for the welfare of the
child.” 73 While it would be “most unusual” for a doctor to give contraceptive advice without the
knowledge of the girl's parents, Lord Fraser was of the attitude that there would be circumstances
where it would be necessary for the doctor to give advice and treatment without the knowledge of
the parents. The doctor would have to be satisfied of the following matters before proceeding:
1.
1. that the girl (although under 16 years of age) will understand his advice;
2.
2. that he cannot persuade her to inform her parents or to allow him to inform the parents that
she is seeking contraceptive advice;
3.
3. that she is very likely to begin or to continue having sexual intercourse with or without
contraceptive treatment;
4.
4. that unless she receives contraceptive advice or treatment, her physical or mental health or
both are likely to suffer;
5.
5. that her best interests require him to give her contraceptive advice, treatment or both without
the parental consent.
Lord Scarman stated that parental rights would yield when the child had reached an age where
she was capable of understanding, based on her level of knowledge and intelligence.74
The question now remains as to whether McKechnie J.'s statements in the Miss D case, coupled
with the common law and statutory positions, open up an avenue for a Gillick-type case in this
jurisdiction. Donnelly notes that there are two options open in the interpretation of s.23 of the
1997 Act: the first is facilitative, giving an automatic power to consent to those over 16 but not
preventing those under 16 from consenting; and the second is preventative, which prevents all
young people aged less than 16 from giving a valid consent.75
McMahon and Binchy question whether an Irish court would take the same approach as Gillick,
and note that it would be difficult for an Irish court to take Donnelly's first facilitative option,
cautioning that one should not overlook “the constitutional dimensions of the question”.76 Tomkin
and Hanafin, 77 having discussed Gillick, also note that “the presence in the Constitution of
Articles 41 and 42 may constitute a barrier to a decision similar to that in the Gillick case being
arrived at”. 78 Quill agrees that it is “almost inconceivable that any litigation on this topic in Ireland
would proceed without resort to constitutional arguments”. 79
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However, Irish legislation outside the context of medical treatment recognises the concept of
developing *72 competence,80 and Mills argues that this, coupled with judicial recognition of
personal rights inhering in the child, 81 lends “at least some credence to the argument that
decision-making authority wielded by under 16s is consistent with Irish constitutional principles”.
82 Madden notes that the language used in the 1997 Act does not seem to be prohibitive of the
under-16 consenting to medical treatment. 83 Duncan also argues that a child has a right to
self-determination under the Constitution, as a corollary of his or her right to privacy and bodily
integrity—now further strengthened by the express constitutional amendment—and that this may
justify the acceptance of the Gillick “mature minor” approach in Irish law. 84 Madden agrees that
as a child has the right to privacy and bodily integrity, an argument could be made that the child
has the right to consent to, or refuse, medical treatment. 85
While some writers are in agreement that Gillick could be accepted in Ireland, they question
whether contraceptive treatment could ever be provided in the absence of parental consent.
Madden, with whom Mills 86 concurs, for example, states:
“It is unclear whether young people under the age of sixteen are … permitted to give
consent, and whether the Irish courts would adopt a principle of individualised assessment of
competence similar to Gillick. Whether the courts would distinguish between contraceptive
treatment/advice and other medical treatment is open to question 87 given the moral and
social connotations involved in this issue in the Irish context.” 88
Donnelly 89 agrees that it is “at least arguable” that Art.42 of the Constitution would prevent an
interpretation of the 1997 Act that would interfere with parental rights to control their children's
right to contraceptive treatment. This is an issue which must face doctors on a regular basis, and
Donnelly observes that while each doctor's decision will be based on the individual
circumstances of the case, “he is hampered in reaching this decision by the absence of clarity in
relation to the legal framework that binds him”. 90 The only guidance given to doctors is equally
lacking in clarity. The Medical Council's Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered
Medical Practitioners states:
“43.5 In exceptional circumstances, a patient under 16 might seek to make a healthcare
decision on their own without the knowledge or consent of their parents. In such cases you
should encourage the patient to involve their parents in the decision, bearing in mind your
paramount responsibility to act in the patient's best interests.”
Two recent studies which appear in the Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland91 show that there is
widespread uncertainty amongst GPs as to what is currently legal in this area. 31.6 per cent of
the GP respondents in Dublin in the first study believed that it is currently legal for a girl aged
under 16 to be prescribed emergency contraception without parental consent; 38.5 per cent said
that it is not legal; and a further 29.9 per cent were uncertain. The majority of those GPs felt
legally exposed when dealing with the area of contraception and emergency contraception. In the
second study in Cork County and City, 18.3 per cent of GPs surveyed who routinely prescribe
contraception to patients would not do so for minors without parental consent; another one-fifth
(18.3 per cent) would not require parental consent; and just under two-thirds (63.4 per cent) of
GPs stated that it would depend on the individual case. Over two-thirds of GPs felt that 16-17 is
the age at which minors are best able to give an informed consent to all forms of medical
treatment, including contraception. 92
Refusal of Medical Treatment for the Young Person, and the Mature Minor
The Law Reform Commission also considers whether a young person (16 and 17) or a person
under 16 has the capacity to refuse medical treatment generally, and more particularly,
life-saving medical treatment.93 This has most commonly arisen either in respect of the refusal of
treatment for a mental illness or the refusal of a life-saving blood transfusion on religious
grounds. The consequences of a refusal have the potential to be more serious, and are, by
definition, at variance with the medical opinion of a patient's best interests. 94
While Lord Scarman suggested obiter in Gillick that the minor assumes both the power to
consent and to refuse treatment,95 subsequent English case law does not lend support to that
position. In Re R, 96 a case which involved a 15-year-old suffering from increasingly paranoid and
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disturbed behaviour, and threatening suicide, Lord Donaldson M.R. was of the opinion that while
a Gillick- competent child could consent to treatment, in the case of a refusal of treatment,
someone with parental rights could consent to treatment. In Re W, 97 the court authorised the
compulsory treatment of a 16-year-old in care who was in a dangerously anorexic state, and in so
doing, confirmed Re R in finding that Gillick did not confer a power of veto on medical treatment
to a minor. In Re M, 98 the court overrode a 15-year-old's objection to a heart transplant on the
basis that it was in her best interests. 99 The young woman sought to refuse the treatment on the
basis that she did not want to have somebody else's heart in her body, and also did not want to
take medication for the rest of her life. The court found that while her wishes on these issues
were certainly important, they were not decisive; death was a certainty, the court found, if the
transplant did not go ahead, and thus her refusal to consent was overridden.
*73
Although the courts have suggested that more weight be attached to the decision of the minor,
there are no English cases in which a minor has been permitted to refuse medical treatment to
save his or her life. It would seem likely, given the significant constitutional protection of the right
to life in this jurisdiction, that this would be true even more so here.
The Law Reform Commission suggests that, in general, a person under 18 should have the
ability to refuse medical treatment in the same way that an adult can, and where life-saving
treatment is refused, it recommends that an application should be made to the High Court to
adjudicate on the refusal.100 It is worth pausing for a moment to examine the adult jurisprudence
on treatment refusal in this regard. In the seminal English case of Re T in 1992, in which the
pregnant Miss T refused a blood transfusion on religious grounds, Lord Donaldson M.R.
observed: “An adult who, like Miss T, suffers from no mental incapacity, has an absolute right to
choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather than another
of the treatments being offered.” 101 Notwithstanding this, the court found that Miss T's consent
was not fully informed and not entirely voluntary.
In an Irish context, in JM v Board of Management of St Vincent's Hospital,102 Finnegan P., whilst
recognising the right of autonomy pursuant to Art.40.3.1° of the Constitution, as set out in the
landmark case of Re a Ward of Court, 103 ruled that a blood transfusion could go ahead,
notwithstanding the patient's prior refusal. In Fitzpatrick v K, 104 again concerning a blood
transfusion on religious grounds, Laffoy J. suggested that the consequences of the refusal were
potentially so extreme that the consent must “reach a particularly high threshold before it can be
considered a valid refusal”. 105 Thus, we see that the court sets a particularly high threshold for
the refusal of life-saving treatment for adults, and it is against this that we are bound to judge our
proposals for reform of the law in relation to children.
When Children have Children: Pregnancy in Young Women
It remains unclear whether it is legally and constitutionally permissible for a medical practitioner
to treat a pregnant young woman or minor in the absence of parental knowledge or consent, and
particularly, whether it is possible for such a medical practitioner to terminate her pregnancy
without the knowledge or consent of her parent or guardian. When the young woman gives birth
to her child, this leaves her in a most paradoxical situation, medico-legally speaking: while she,
as the parent of the child, has the full panoply of rights in relation to that child and can fully
consent to, or refuse medical treatment on behalf of the child,106 on a strict interpretation of the
law, she cannot consent to even a basic medical examination without the consent of her parents
or guardian.
Aside from the question of prenatal care, which presumably falls within the remit of the general
legislative position, this issue comes into most sharp relief for any young woman under the age of
18 when we consider the question of termination of pregnancy. Section 2 of the Protection of Life
During Pregnancy Act 2013 defines “woman” as “a female person of any age”. The question is
whether this has the effect of permitting a doctor to treat any pregnant teenager, regardless of
age, in the absence of parental/guardian consent or knowledge. In examining this question,
again, we must consider the application of Arts 41 and 42 of the Constitution. The issue arose in
Re Article 26 and the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for the Termination of
Pregnancies) Bill 1995.107 Here, it was argued that because the term “woman” was not defined in
the Act, a young person could seek abortion information without the knowledge or consent of her
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parents, thus rendering the Act unconstitutional as a violation of Arts 41 and 42. Hamilton C.J.
stated in response to this argument that:
“[I]t must be presumed that in the giving of such information, counselling and advice, the
person giving same will have regard to and give advice in accordance with the principles of
Constitutional justice and if there is any departure from these principles, such departure
would be restrained and corrected by the Courts.”108
These principles of constitutional justice were not defined or described, but it is presumed that
the Chief Justice had Arts 41 and 42 in mind. Whether the Medical Council's Guidelines and the
Law Reform Commission's interpretation of s.23 of the 1997 Act amount to a protection of these
principles is also unclear.
Young People and Minors in the Care of the State
Depending on the type of care order made under the Child Care Act 1991, either the District
Judge (in the case of emergency care orders, interim care orders and interim special care orders)
or the Child and Family Agency (in the case of care orders and special care orders) can consent
on behalf of the young person or minor, or give directions in relation to their treatment. Generally
speaking, these provisions will apply where the medical treatment in question is a life-saving
termination of pregnancy.
A and B v C (the “C case”)109 concerned a young woman in the care of the health board whose
parents *74 opposed the decision to terminate her pregnancy. Geoghegan J. was of the opinion
that, rather than conferring a right of abortion outside of the jurisdiction, the travel amendment
“merely prevents injunctions against travelling for that purpose”. 110 This case did not involve an
injunction; rather, the case concerned the question of whether the health board could facilitate
this girl travelling under the terms of the Child Care Act 1991. Geoghegan J. was of the opinion
that the court could not permit the young woman to travel if the termination proposed was one
which was not allowed under Irish law. 111
On the basis of this ruling, it was thought that while parents could lawfully bring their child to
another jurisdiction to terminate the pregnancy of that child, where the child was not in the care of
her parents, the situation was different. In these circumstances, such as children in the care of a
health board, wards of court and certain children detained under the Mental Health Act 2001,
where consent of the court was required in order to medically treat a child, or for them to travel,
unless the termination was a constitutionally permissible one, the court could not sanction the
treatment and the young person would be forced to bring her pregnancy to term.112
However, the situation was again interpreted differently in the “Miss D” case, in which the
17-year-old girl seeking a termination was in the care of the HSE. The HSE refused to give her
permission to travel, and attempted to prevent her from obtaining a passport. Miss D took an
action seeking to prevent the HSE from restraining her from travelling to the UK for the abortion.
Considering the question of whether the HSE was correct in seeking District Court approval for
Miss D to travel to the UK to terminate her pregnancy, McKechnie J. stated:
“… there was no law or provision of the Child Care Act which restrained a child in care from
travelling for an abortion or which would support the HSE's claim that District Court
permission was required for travel. Miss D's right to travel for an abortion was unaffected by
Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution.”113
Due to her “courage, integrity and maturity”, McKechnie J. held that there was “no impediment to
the applicant exercising her right to travel to England”.114
Thus, McKechnie J. held that Miss D's right to travel took precedence over the right to life of the
unborn. There was a shift from Geoghegan J.'s position—where he believed that the State, and
the courts, were under an obligation to protect the right to life of the unborn to the point that the
court could not positively sanction travel for an unconstitutional abortion—to McKechnie J.'s
decision, where the right to travel was paramount, trumping the right to life of the unborn. It could
be argued that the Miss D case was decided on the basis of her capacity to consent to treatment,
rather than Art.40.3.3°, but this issue requires resolution.
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Best Interests or Best Medical Interests?
Throughout this article, one theme has emerged, namely the question of how the best interests of
a person under the age of 18 in the context of medical decision-making are to be determined.
Where parents or guardians agree, particularly in the context of the administration of treatment
(though not in the context of refusal of all forms of treatment, and certainly not in the context of
life-saving treatment), it seems that there is little question as to whether the State can interfere.
Where parents disagree, or where a young person disagrees with his or her parents or guardians
and/or the medical practitioners on the question of treatment, the question becomes much less
clear. When we seek to determine the best interests of a child, it would appear that courts have in
the past deferred to the advice of medical practitioners: that is, that the best interests of the child
are equated with the best medical interests of the child.
The European Convention on Human Rights, and emerging jurisprudence from the European
Court of Human Rights, would suggest that a broader formulation of “best interests” is necessary.
The College of Psychiatry, in its submission on the Assisted Decision-Making Bill 2013,
acknowledged that “while the concept of ‘best interests’ may have been misused in the past it
can, when used correctly, be an important and empowering concept”.115 The interpretation by the
courts of “best interests” in the Mental Health Act 2001 has revealed that best interests are being
equated with best medical interests, 116 and for this reason, under the review of the Mental Health
Act 2001 it has been recommended that s.4, which deals with “best interests”, needs to be
amended to reflect an understanding that gives prominence to the “dignity, bodily integrity,
privacy and autonomy” of the individual. In England, for example, under the Mental Capacity Act
Code of Practice, there is a best interests checklist. 117 This broader thinking tallies with the more
engaged and consultative process we saw earlier in the Children and Family Relationships Act
2015. We would suggest that in the context of medical decision-making, a broad definition of best
interests should be adopted.
Law Reform Commission Recommendations for Reform
Rather than dealing with the issues raised in this article on a piecemeal basis, we would argue
that the preferable option is to legislate in accordance with the proposals of the Law Reform
Commission in its 2011 Report,118 which set out clearly the circumstances in which medical
treatment can be given to, and refused *75 by, young people and minors. The Commission's
proposals place the best interests of the young person at the heart of any consideration, 119 and
the Commission states that due weight be given to the views of the child given his or her age and
maturity. 120 In relation to those aged 16 and 17, the Commission's proposed Bill states quite
simply: “The capacity of a person who is 16 or 17 years of age is as effective as it would be if he
or she were of full age, that is, 18 years of age”, though this is a rebuttable presumption, “subject
to contrary evidence that the person lacks capacity”. 121
Section 8 of the proposed Bill provides that where a person under the age of 18 refuses
life-sustaining medical treatment, “an application may be made to the High Court to determine the
validity of the refusal”. The High Court may order that such life-saving treatment be administered
where it is in the best interests of the person involved.
In the context of minors (i.e. those under the age of 16), the Commission proposes that while
there is no presumption of capacity, where the minor proves sufficiently mature and has the
understanding to appreciate the nature and consequences of the treatment in question, that
minor may consent to or refuse medical treatment.122 In these circumstances, it shall also be
presumed that parents or guardians are involved in the decision-making process, although in
exceptional circumstances, treatment may be administered in the absence of parental knowledge
or consent. 123
Conclusion
We cannot ignore the influence of Gillick nor the Convention on the Rights of the Child nor the
recent children's rights constitutional amendment in terms of giving children more rights and
acknowledging that they are advancing in their decision-making capabilities and maturity. It is
important that those advances in terms of children's rights are not just “tick box” exercises, which
they are in danger of being if we do not allow children to refuse as well as consent to treatment.
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We have seen that in adult cases, where the consequences of a refusal of treatment are severe,
the law will step in and override that refusal, as in the Mental Health Act 2001 and in cases
relating to life-saving blood transfusions. We are suggesting, therefore, that the Law Reform
Commission's formulation of allowing children to refuse as well as consent to medical treatment,
with the provision for an application to the High Court if the outcome were potentially sufficiently
grave, is the correct approach. That said, a code of practice as to a more nuanced definition of
“best interests” is required. The current system of legislative uncertainty is unacceptable for
practitioners treating young people and requires urgent reform.
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